Hugging Face has introduced AprielGuard, an 8B parameter safety and adversarial safeguard model built for modern LLM agent ecosystems. Designed to detect multi-turn jailbreaks, prompt injections, and tool manipulation, the model is available in reasoning and non-reasoning modes. It is trained on synthetic data, data augmentations, and specialized datasets covering agentic workflows and long contexts up to 32k tokens.
Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly evolved from text-only assistants into complex agentic systems capable of performing multi-step reasoning, calling external tools, retrieving memory, and executing code. With this evolution comes an increasingly sophisticated threat landscape: not only traditional content safety risks, but also multi-turn jailbreaks, prompt injections, memory hijacking, and tool manipulation.
In this work, we introduce AprielGuard , an 8B parameter safety–security safeguard model designed to detect:
AprielGuard is available in both reasoning and non-reasoning modes, enabling explainable classification when needed and low-latency classification for production pipelines.
We curated an internal benchmark dataset aimed at evaluating the detection of Safety Risks and Adversarial Attacks within agentic workflows. To construct this benchmark, we systematically designed multiple attack scenarios targeting different components of the workflow—such as prompt inputs, reasoning traces, tool parameters, memory states, and inter-agent communications. Each instance was annotated according to the taxonomy of vulnerabilities. Each workflow was simulated to reflect realistic executions, incorporating both benign and adversarial sequences. The dataset captures granular attack points across various stages such as planning, reasoning, execution, and response generation to provide fine-grained evaluation of model robustness. Overall, the dataset comprises a balanced mixture of safety risks and adversarial attacks.
A major limitation in the current landscape of content moderation research is the scarcity of high- quality multilingual benchmarks. To address this gap and comprehensively assess the multilingual capabilities of AprielGuard, we extended the Safety Risks benchmarks and Adversarial Attack benchmarks into multiple non-English languages. The translation process was conducted using the MADLAD400-3B-MT model, a multilingual machine translation model based on the T5 architecture.
Data augmentation : To enhance model robustness, a range of data augmentation techniques were applied to the training data. These augmentations are designed to expose the model to natural variations and perturbations that commonly occur in real-world scenarios. Specifically, the dataset includes transformations such as character-level noise, insertion of typographical errors, leetspeak substitutions, word-level paraphrasing, and syntactic reordering. Such augmentations help the model generalize better by reducing sensitivity to superficial variations in input, thereby improving resilience against adversarial manipulations and non-standard text representations.
Agentic workflows : Agentic workflows represent real-world scenarios where autonomous agents execute multi-step tasks involving planning, reasoning, and interaction with tools, APIs, and other agents. These workflows often include sequences of user prompts, system messages, intermediate reasoning steps, and tool invocations, making them susceptible to diverse attack vectors. To construct these training data points, we synthetically generate a wide range of scenarios across multiple domains, capturing realistic agentic interactions between a user and an agentic system. Each data point is enriched with detailed contextual elements—including tool definitions, tool invocation logs, agent roles and policies, execution traces, conversation history, memory states, and scratch-pad reasoning. For malicious or adversarial examples, we corrupt the relevant segment of the workflow to reflect a specific attack vector. Depending on the scenario, this may involve modifying user prompts, altering intermediate reasoning traces, modifying the tool outputs, injecting false memory states, or disrupting inter-agent communication. By systematically perturbing different components of the agentic workflow, we produce high-fidelity examples that expose a model to a diverse spectrum of realistic and challenging attack patterns. Each data point was simulated to reflect realistic executions, incorporating both benign and adversarial sequences.
Long context use cases : We curated a specialized long context dataset composed of diverse, high-length use cases such as Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) work-flows, multi-turn conversational threads, incident details, and operational reports containing detailed communications. These examples simulate real-world environments where large text contexts are typical.
Traditional safety classifiers primarily focus on a limited classification spectrum (e.g., toxicity or self-harm), assume short inputs, and evaluate single user messages. Modern deployments, however, feature:
As a result, production teams increasingly rely on workarounds: multiple guard models for different stages, regex filters, static rules, or hand-crafted heuristics. These approaches are brittle and do not scale.
AprielGuard addresses these issues with a unified model and a unified safety + adversarial taxonomy , built specifically for modern LLM agent ecosystems.
As large language models evolve into complex agentic systems facing sophisticated multi-turn and tool-based threats, traditional safety classifiers fall short. AprielGuard offers a unified model designed to handle these modern agentic workflows and long-context scenarios.